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ADVANCE DIRECTIVES, DEMENTIA, AND ELIGIBILITY FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH
I.

INTRODUCTION

In most of the jurisdictions where some form of physician-assisted death (PAD)2
is legal, 3 the requesting individual must be competent to make medical decisions at
the time of assistance. The requirement of contemporary competence is intended to
ensure that PAD is limited to people who genuinely want to die and have
decisionmaking cognitive ability at the time of a final choice with such enormous
import. Along with terminal illness, defined as the prognosis of death within six
months, contemporary competence is regarded as an important safeguard against
mistake and abuse, which are arguably the strongest objections to legalizing PAD.

1.

Much of this article’s factual data and moral analysis, and many segments of its specific articulation, are
contained in the primary and longer paper from which it is derived. See generally Paul T. Menzel &
Bonnie Steinbock, Advance Directives, Dementia, and Physician-Assisted Death, 41 J.L. Med. & Ethics
484 (2013). The Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics paper pursues the moral argument at greater length
through eight paradigm cases of persons with dementia. The current article’s analysis in Parts III–VI is
considerably shorter, and it focuses more on all three of the basic eligibility conditions for legal physicianassisted death, not only current competency. Part VII of this article is entirely new. The background
research that enabled me to construct this article was supported by a month as Visiting Researcher at the
Brocher Foundation, Hermance, Switzerland, in April 2012. I am greatly indebted to my co-author of
the primary article that resulted from that research, Bonnie Steinbock. While at Brocher, we benefited
greatly from consultation with Dr. Samia Hurst of the Institute of Biomedical Ethics, University of
Geneva Medical School. I also received helpful feedback at the Freedom of Choice at the End of Life:
Patients’ Rights in a Shifting Legal and Political Landscape symposium at New York Law School on
November 16, 2012, especially in conversation with Professor Peter J. Strauss, the symposium chair.

2.

The term “physician-assisted death” covers both physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. In physicianassisted suicide, the patient takes lethal drugs made available through a physician’s prescription; in
euthanasia, the physician delivers the lethal drugs, usually by injection. The term “physician-assisted
suicide” has fallen out of favor among many proponents, who wish to distinguish it from suicide in
general and therefore prefer “aid in dying.”

3.

Namely, in Vermont, Oregon, Washington, and Montana in the United States, and in Belgium and
Switzerland. Aid in dying is legal by statute in Vermont, Oregon, and Washington. See Patient Choice and
Control at End of Life Act, ch. 113, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5291 (West 2013); Oregon Death with
Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800–897 (West 2013); Washington Death with Dignity Act,
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.245.010–904 (West 2013). It is legal by a decision of the state supreme court in
Montana. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009). In June 2012, it became conditionally legal by
court decision in British Columbia, though that decision was subsequently overturned by the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in October 2013. Carter v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 2012 BCSC 886 (Can. B.C.),
available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/12/08/2012BCSC0886cor1.htm, rev’d, 2013 BCCA
435 (Can. B.C. Ct. App.), available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/CA/13/04/2013BCCA0435.
htm. In Belgium, the patient must be legally competent and conscious at the moment of making the
request for euthanasia. See The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28, 2002, 9 Ethical Perspectives
182 (2002), available at http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/viewpic.php?LAN=E&TABLE=EP&ID=59
(unofficial translation by Dale Kidd & Herman Nys), although legislation was introduced in 2013 that
would expand euthanasia to minors and those suffering from dementia. See Connor Adams Sheets, Belgian
Parliament Posed to Approve Child Euthanasia Law, Int’l Bus. Times (June 11, 2013, 3:03 PM), http://
www.ibtimes.com/belgian-parliament-posed-approve-child-euthanasia-law-1301825. In Switzerland,
both physician-assisted suicide and assisted suicide more generally are legal by statute, and though
voluntary self-administration is required, it is not restricted to terminal illness. See Samia A. Hurst & Alex
Mauron, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Switzerland: Allowing a Role for Non-Physicians, 326 BMJ 271,
271–73 (2003), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1125125/.
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In the Netherlands and Belgium, where euthanasia is legal, terminal illness is not
required. In the Netherlands, neither is contemporary competence; the focus is
instead on voluntariness, a requirement that can in some cases be satisfied by the
patient’s previous decisions and directives. In both countries, unbearable suffering is
also required.4
These various qualifying conditions for PAD—contemporary competence,
terminal illness, and unbearable suffering—preclude its use for patients with chronic
severe dementia. Although patients in the early stages of dementia may still be
competent, they lose the ability to make medical decisions for themselves as dementia
progresses. Nor are most patients in even severe dementia considered terminally ill;
chronic progressive dementia is typically not seen as terminal illness until its very
final stages, and, even then, prognoses of six months or less to live due to end-stage
dementia are treacherous. Nor is unbearable suffering a common characteristic of
people with severe dementia, yet many are as opposed—or even more strongly
opposed—to having their lives end in years of severe dementia as they are to enduring
a few months of suffering at the end of life. If they have a right to choose death to
avoid the latter, why do they not have a right to avoid the former?
Dementia thus poses a strong challenge to the current legal limits on PAD.
Access to PAD for persons with dementia, not just for those who are currently
competent, terminally ill, or unbearably suffering, will become an increasingly
pressing issue as the world’s population ages. By 2040, the number of those over age
eighty-five will nearly quadruple from what it was in 2000.5 Almost half of people
over eighty-five have some form of dementia.6 About 5.2 million Americans have
Alzheimer’s disease, the most common form.7 These numbers will rise progressively
over the next several decades.
This article will make the case that through clear, informed, and persistent
advance directives, people should be allowed to direct their future death in the event
of severe dementia. Neither current competency, terminal illness, nor unbearable
suffering should be retained as strict qualifying conditions for legalized PAD. Other
limitations can preserve its voluntariness, prevent its abuse, and respect the value of
patients’ lives.
4.

For Dutch law, see Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act
(2002), available at http://www.eutanasia.ws/documentos/Leyes/Internacional/Holanda Ley 2002.pdf.
The procedures codified in the 2002 law reflect Dutch medical practice since 1973, when doctors began
openly providing euthanasia on request. Two doctors must certify that the patient’s desire to die stems
from “hopeless and unbearable suffering.” Under the Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28, 2002, supra
note 3, two physicians must certify that the person endures constant and unbearable physical or
psychological pain from incurable illness or accident; a third medical opinion to the same effect must be
obtained if the person is not terminally ill.

5.

The U.S. Population Is Aging, Urban Inst., http://www.urban.org/retirement_policy/agingpopulation.
cfm (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).

6.

Dementia: Hope Through Research, Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders & Stroke, http://www.
ninds.nih.gov/disorders/dementias/detail_dementia.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2013).

7.

Alzheimer’s Facts and Figures, Alzheimer’s Ass’n, http://www.alz.org/alzheimers_disease_facts_and_
figures.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
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Those limitations include the three conditions on advance directives already
indicated—they must be clear, informed, and persistent. To be clear, a directive for
implementation in later dementia must not refer to just “dementia” without further
specification; it must convey what stage of severity of dementia the person wants to
trigger application of the directive, including specific conditions that one may regard
as relevant (for example, an inability to recognize close friends and loved ones). The
directive must be informed about the primary condition, dementia, to which it speaks;
it should recognize, for example, that persons with dementia have great emotional
variance—they can be distressed, or angry, or relatively content and happy. Directives
are also more authoritative when they are persistent—when they have been reiterated
in the early stages of dementia (for example, when a person becomes more familiar
with the condition but can still understand her directive).
Throughout the last two decades in the Netherlands, and just recently in
Belgium, the prospect of using PAD for patients with dementia has sparked a great
deal of discussion.8 In 2011, an important Dutch case raised precisely the question of
whether the voluntariness requirement demands contemporaneous competence.9
The Dutch concluded that it did not.10 For PAD as well as the refusal of lifesupporting treatment, they concluded that voluntariness can be satisfied by clear and
reiterated advance directives.11
In a jurisdiction—such as the Netherlands—where euthanasia is permitted,
patient directives for later use of PAD naturally warrant the term “advance euthanasia
directives” (AEDs). Where euthanasia is illegal, however, it will be difficult to refer
to such directives as advance euthanasia directives. Nonetheless, even where aid in
dying, but not euthanasia, is permitted, competent individuals could still be allowed
to write advance directives for aid in dying in the event of a mentally debilitating
condition such as severe dementia. In those jurisdictions, such directives would
technically be “advance directives for aid in dying” (ADAID). Instead of using this
awkward neologism, I will use the shorter term “AED” for this situation as well and
make the case for AEDs in that broader context.
While AEDs for dementia can be morally justified and acted on in their primary
intended circumstances, I will also argue that the issue of when they should actually be
followed is exceedingly complex and multifaceted. One complexity has to do with the
range of cognitive abilities and quality of life in dementia. Another has to do with the
fact that the demented person may change her mind about preferring death to living
with dementia, in which case we should not hold the person to her AED. In still other
cases, even where there has been no change of mind and the directive is clear and
8.

See Cees M.P.M. Hertogh et al., Would We Rather Lose Our Life than Lose Our Self? Lessons from the
Dutch Debate on Euthanasia for Patients with Dementia, 7 Am. J. Bioethics 48, 48–56 (2007). For recent
developments in Belgium, see Sheets, supra note 3.

9.

See Michael Cook, Informed Consent in Netherlands: Euthanasia, BioEdge (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.
bioedge.org/index.php/bioethics/bioethics_article/9826.

10.

See id.

11.

See infra Part II for a discussion of both this case and Dutch law on PAD.

324

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 58 | 2013/14

informed, due consideration of both the demented person’s best interests and relevant
societal considerations can point toward not implementing it. Thus, whether the use of
AEDs should be permitted to avoid prolonged life in dementia does not have a simple
yes-or-no answer. It depends on important differentiating details.
Part II briefly reviews the main arguments in favor of PAD, noting that they
apply not only to terminal illness, but also to avoiding prolonged life in dementia. It
also describes the developing situation in the Netherlands, including the 2011 case
mentioned above. Part III lays out some basic information about dementia and relates
that to the requisite clarity and voluntariness of actionable AEDs and the issue of
later changes of mind. Part IV takes up the most fundamental challenge for advance
directives that is posed by the difference between the competent pre-dementia self
(the “then-self ”) and the current self in dementia (the “now-self ”); the prominent
views of Rebecca Dresser, John Robertson, Ronald Dworkin, and Agnieszka
Jaworska are considered.
I delineate my own view in Parts V, VI, and VII. Part V explains how the value
of life varies greatly in dementia and why that makes a patient’s advance into severe
dementia critical to the authority of an AED. Part VI pulls the most important
moral considerations into the notion of a “sliding scale,” where the case for
implementing an AED gains as the person’s capacity to generate new values and to
enjoy life decreases. In Part VII, I argue that—despite the fact that severe dementia
can rarely be deemed a “terminal illness” in the sense of death being likely within six
months—it is a terminal illness in other highly relevant respects. In Part VIII, I
review the previous moral analysis and articulate a conceptual path for moving from
legalized aid in dying to actionable AEDs for severe dementia.
II. BASIC MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH AND DUTCH LAW

The two basic moral arguments in favor of PAD focus on suffering and on
autonomy. The former maintains that it is cruel to force a terminally ill patient to
continue to suffer terrible pain at the end of life when such pain cannot be eradicated
or adequately controlled and has no purpose (such as restoring the patient to health).
Clearly the argument based on suffering is not limited to competent individuals; a
person in dementia may suffer as much as someone with greater cognitive capacity.
The argument based on autonomy focuses on the right of people to make crucial
decisions about how their lives will go for themselves, without interference from the
state.12 Many have argued that the same value of autonomy that underlies the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment is also implicated in a right to choose death.13 They
regard as irrational a situation where the law allows people to die certain and expedited
12.

The right to refuse medical treatment, including life-sustaining medical treatment, is well established in
the United States by common law and landmark court decisions, including Quinlan, Cruzan, and
Bouvia. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 659–60, 663–64 (N.J. 1976) (reasoning that an individual’s
right to discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment overcomes state interests); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 263 (1990); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1134
(1986) (holding that a patient has a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment).

13.

See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 10, 10–22 (1992).
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deaths by refusing to eat and drink,14 or by refusing life-supportive treatment, but
does not allow them to have their doctors provide them with a quick and painless
death.15 It would seem to be similarly irrational to allow people to use advance
directives to expedite death by refusing life-supportive treatment, but not by PAD.
The arguments based on suffering and autonomy are not inherently limited to
terminal illness. Suffering can be as great, if not greater, when it extends through the
much longer time of chronic, non-terminal illness, and people can have strong, fully
voluntary, and informed convictions that death would best come sooner rather than
later even if they are not terminally ill.
In this article, I will assume that these basic arguments for aid in dying are
ultimately convincing and put to one side the general debate about its fundamental
moral and legal legitimacy.16 The focus, instead, will be on the question of whether—
by dropping the requirements of contemporaneous competence, prognosis of death
within six months, and unbearable suffering—PAD can be justifiably expanded to
allow for its application to situations of severe dementia.
In the Netherlands, PAD has recently been expanded in respect to terminal
illness and contemporaneous competence. For two decades, the Dutch have had a
vigorous debate about the eligibility for euthanasia of patients with severe dementia.17
Traditionally, Dutch doctors have interpreted the requirement that euthanasia be a
voluntary and carefully considered decision of patients to rule out persons with
dementia. In March 2011, however, a Dutch woman in severe dementia received
euthanasia.18 The woman was not named, but I will refer to her as “Lotte.” She was
sixty-four years old and a long-time supporter of the Dutch euthanasia law. When
fully competent, she had written an advance directive in which she expressed her
desire to die rather than go into a nursing home. Lotte repeated this desire over time
to her family physician, and she was supported in her request by husband and
children. As dementia grew more severe, she could remember only bits of her
directive. Nevertheless, in every conversation with her doctor, she said that she would
rather die than go into a nursing home. She also appeared to be suffering; she was
frequently angry, confused, and cried often. Ultimately, her doctors judged that both
14.

For an extensive defense of this path to death, see generally Stanley A. Terman et al., The Best
Way to Say Goodbye: A Legal Peaceful Choice at the End of Life (2007). For an extensive
treatment of the legal status of voluntarily stopping eating and drinking (VSED), see generally
Thaddeus Mason Pope & Lindsey E. Anderson, Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking: A Legal
Treatment Option at the End of Life, 17 Widener L. Rev. 363 (2011).

15.

See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia and
Individual Freedom 184 (1993); Brock, supra note 13, at 19.

16.

For an opposing view, see Herbert Hendin & Kathleen Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A
Medical Perspective, 24 Issues L. & Med. 121, 121 (2008).

17.

See Hertogh et al., supra note 8, at 48; Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot Bevordering
der Geneeskunst (KNMG Royal Dutch Med. Ass’n), The Role of the Physician in the
Voluntary Termination of Life (2011) [hereinafter Dutch Position Paper], available at http://
knmg.artsennet.nl/Publicaties/KNMGpublicatie/Position-paper-The-role-of-the-physician-in-thevoluntary-termination-of-life-2011.htm.

18.

See Cook, supra note 9.
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of the essential legal requirements—voluntariness and unbearable suffering—were
met. All five relevant review committees concluded the same.19
The significance of the decision for Lotte was magnified by the fact that shortly
thereafter, in June 2011, the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) issued a
major position paper including new guidelines for interpreting the Dutch euthanasia
law.20 An obvious concern about the expansion of euthanasia to patients in dementia
or with chronic psychiatric illness is abuse. The KNMG called such cases especially
difficult: “Any assessment of the considerations prompting such a request and of
whether the suffering is indeed unbearable and lasting is generally much more
complicated in this category of patients . . . . [P]hysicians [need to] act with extreme
caution and restraint . . . .”21
Voluntariness is also critically important in the Dutch euthanasia law. Under the
new guidelines of the KNMG, the voluntariness requirement can be satisfied by
evidence that euthanasia is what the patient wanted, even if the patient is now no
longer competent.22 Carefully considered advance directives are one of the best kinds
of evidence, especially if they are reiterated over time, 23 including in early dementia
when one presumably has a clearer idea of what life in dementia means, and they
speak clearly to the patient’s current dementia situation.
Lotte’s case and the Dutch guidelines that emerged shortly thereafter have set
the stage for a mature discussion of legally actionable AEDs. The directives that
Dutch law considers viable, and on which the discussion of this article will focus, are
not just any AEDs. They are directives that clearly speak to dementia, and that have
been carefully considered and persistently reiterated by their authors. This article
will focus on whether and when directives of this specific sort should be implemented.
III. VOLUNTARINESS: UNDERSTANDING DEMENTIA

To be truly voluntary in the morally relevant sense, a directive needs to be well
informed. If it harbors misinformation about dementia, it carries less moral force,
and perhaps much less. To expand the legalization of PAD to advance directives for
dementia, therefore, the directives need to emerge from a reasonably accurate
understanding of dementia—its varying stages and qualitative types, the risk of
prejudicially stereotyping it, and the potential for adaptation and changes of mind.
Dementia refers to a wide range of cognitive impairments and memory loss severe
enough to interfere with the normal functions of daily life. The range from mild to
severe or advanced dementia is conveyed in the array of deficits used in clinical
19.

See id.

20. See id.
21.

Dutch Position Paper, supra note 17, at 7.

22.

See id. at 12.

23.

This moral condition was foreshadowed by Leslie P. Francis in 1993. See generally Leslie P. Francis,
Advance Directives for Voluntary Euthanasia: A Volatile Combination?, 18 J. Med. & Phil. 3, 297–322
(1993).
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assessment tests, such as the Functional Assessment Staging Test.24 According to this
test, the deficits in “mild” dementia affect daily functions such as bill paying, cooking,
house cleaning, and traveling. A person in “moderate” dementia requires help in
slightly more basic daily activities, such as selecting one’s clothes. In “moderately
severe” dementia, the person has difficulty putting on clothes, bathing, and toileting
(with urinary or fecal incontinence). In “severe” dementia, one is unable to speak daily
more than five to six words in all, or more than two words clearly, and one lacks either
the ability to walk, to sit up, to hold up one’s head, or to smile. Inability to recognize
even the closest friends and relatives often accompanies severe dementia.
Some scales define a more advanced “very severe” stage, in which “all verbal
abilities are lost . . . . These patients . . . require assistance in toileting and in eating.
They . . . lose psychomotor skills [as though the brain is] no longer . . . able to tell the
body what to do.”25 It will become clear in my later analysis (Parts V–VII, especially)
that the features of severe and very severe dementia are highly relevant to the
authority that an AED holds for its implementation. I will refer to the achievement
of this morally relevant stage as “severe” or “advanced” dementia, without attending
to any more refined differences between “severe” and “very severe” dementia.
The extent to which the impairments of dementia interfere with subjective
quality of life varies. When the cognitive level of mental life has changed, the effect
on affective temperament can range from positive to highly negative. Some with
dementia are continually frightened or at moments extremely scared, or anxious and
irritable, perhaps even violent. Others are evidently happy, sometimes eagerly
participating in the activities of which they are still capable. Only rarely, however, do
such fortuitous characteristics obtain in severe or advanced dementia.
Judgments about the degree of personality change with dementia are complicated
by the fact that, most of the time, capacities lost may briefly re-emerge in moments
of temporary lucidity. At such times, it may be possible to determine whether the
individual still holds the beliefs or values previously expressed in an advance directive
or in actions throughout their lives. The patient may show flashes of “her old self,”
even into fairly severe dementia.
The variety and unpredictability within dementia—even within a given
diagnostic type such as Alzheimer’s—must be taken into account for a directive to be
reasonably well informed. No one can know in advance whether she will be among
the “happy demented” or the terribly frightened and anxious. Nonetheless, advance
directives can make helpful reference to clinically defined stages such as “severe” or
“advanced,” and to specific manifestations such as the inability to recognize close
24.

See, e.g., Med. Care Corp., Functional Assessment Staging Test, available at http://www.
mciscreen.com/pdf/fast_overview.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).

25.

This corresponds to Stage Seven of the longstanding Global Deterioration Scale used since 1982. See
Barry Reisberg et al., The Global Deterioration Scale for Assessment of Primary Degenerative Disease, 139
Am. J. Psychiatry 1136, 1138 (1982). Other authors label this stage “advanced,” adding the clarification
of the inability to recognize familiar faces or to walk, as well as the incontinence of urine and stool. See
Susan L. Mitchell et al., Advanced Dementia: State of the Art and Priorities for the Next Decade, 156
Annals Internal Med. 45, 47 (2012). Sometimes the “advanced” or “very severe” stage is referred to
as “end-stage” dementia.
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friends and relatives that the author of the directive regards as especially relevant to
her concerns. The directives that create the strongest case for their implementation
will be those that indicate an understanding that dementia comes in a variety of
stages and affective characters.
Difficulties in writing an informed AED for application in dementia stem not
only from unpredictable variation in dementia’s stages and effects. A further related
problem is that people often think prospectively that they would find a particular
disabling condition unbearable or worse than death, only to find that, when they
actually experience the condition, it is not nearly as bad as they thought it would be.
Sometimes such misjudgment is due to a failure of imagination about future life.
People focus only on the abilities and pleasurable experiences they will lose, without
recognizing potentially positive aspects to living in an “eternal present” with severe
memory loss.26 Another relevant factor is later adaptation.27 While people experience
a drop in subjective well-being upon becoming disabled, they often regain the level
of happiness they had previously. An AED written in ignorance of this potential for
adaptation has less moral force.
One of the ways in which the reality of adaptation can be revealed is later changes
of mind about the value of life in dementia. All parties—authors of the directives,
later caregivers, and loved ones—should be sensitive to this possibility. Increasing
forgetfulness and failure to recognize most friends, for example, may sometimes not
be experienced as nearly as destructive of quality of life as people thought it would
be. In early and moderate stages of dementia, therefore, people may actually change
their minds about what they said in their directive. In two ways, at least, this fact
should be accommodated. First, explicitly in a directive, an author can express
awareness of such possible changes of mind, and second, third parties later should
watch for changes of mind, an issue I will return to in Part V.
Attitudes toward disability, including dementia, can also stem from societal
prejudice. Some of what people recoil from in the prospect of severe dementia—the
incontinence, drooling, loss of mobility, and extreme dependence, for example—may
spring from unenlightened attitudes. 28 Persuasive advance directives for dementia
will not evidence such attitudes, and perhaps they should even expressly acknowledge
their danger.
26. See, e.g., Robert Leleux, The Living End: A Memoir of Forgetting and Forgiving 101 (2012).

As his grandmother—who was estranged from her daughter—lost memory and sense of time, grudges
and old hurt feelings disappeared. She forgot what had made her angry. Id.
27.

This is strongly confirmed in the psychological literature. See Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein,
Hedonic Adaptation in Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 302–29 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., Russell Sage Found. 1999); Paul T. Menzel et al., The Role of Adaptation to Disability
and Disease in Health State Valuation: A Preliminary Analysis, 55 Soc. Sci. & Med. 2149, 2149–58 (2002);
David Arnold et al., Comparison of Direct and Indirect Methods of Estimating Health State Utilities for Resource
Allocation: Review and Empirical Analysis, 339 BMJ 385 (2009), available at http://www.bmj.com/
content/339/bmj.b2688.pdf%2Bhtml.

28. See Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death While Affirming Life: Can End of Life Reform Uphold a Disabled

Person’s Interest in Continued Life?, 35:6 Hastings Ctr. Rep. S31 (2005).
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Some people, too, may view living in dementia as a fate worse than death because
of lamentable, sub-standard conditions that can characterize nursing homes. It goes
without saying that such conditions are unacceptable and that steps to improve the
lives of people with dementia need to be taken. Certainly, however, not all nursing
home care is deficient.
All of these factors—failure to understand dementia, prejudice, lack of
imagination, failure to appreciate adaptation, fear of poor nursing home care—can
diminish a directive’s moral weight. The desire to die to avoid years in severe
dementia, however, does not have to reflect such biasing factors. As will be argued
later in Part V, that desire can be based on strong and legitimate convictions about
the meaning and narrative of one’s life. Dementia has profound effects on selfhood,
making it arguably different from other disabling conditions.
This point is illustrated, ironically, by the way that a strong critic of prejudice
against disabled persons, Adrienne Asch, explains how many people with profound
disabilities can be helped to live full, meaningful lives. With assistance, they can
hold jobs, engage in volunteer activities, visit friends . . . and generally
participate in ordinary family, civic, and social life. Wheelchairs do not
confine; they liberate . . . . Using the services and skills of a personal assistant
who helps them . . . is no more shameful or embarrassing than it is for a
nondisabled person . . . to value the expertise of a mechanic . . . .29

Note how little of this applies to people in severe dementia. They do not hold jobs,
engage in volunteer activities, or socialize with family and friends. Moreover, the
interest in determining how one’s life should go, including how it would best end, is
an interest shared equally by the “temporarily abled” and disabled alike.
A strong directive for PAD in dementia should manifest an awareness of
dementia’s varying stages, its variable effects, prejudicial attitudes toward it, and the
potential to adapt to it.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE: THE “NOW-SELF” AND THE “THEN-SELF”

The most serious and difficult challenge to the authority of advance directives is
that the very condition that gives rise to them—the inability to participate in medical
decisionmaking—can dramatically change one’s interests. Rebecca Dresser and John
Robertson make this criticism of the so-called “orthodox approach” of American
courts.30 The logic of that approach begins with the right of competent patients to
refuse medical treatment even when it is necessary to preserve their lives. And then,
since people do not lose their rights simply because they happen to become
29. Id. at S32–S33.
30. Rebecca Dresser & John S. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent

Patients, 17 J.L. Med. & Ethics 234, 234–40 (1989). For an insightful and comprehensive treatment of
this challenge, which also relates to Dresser’s numerous other writings, see L.W. Sumner, Assisted
Death: A Study in Ethics and Law 103–17 (2011). Sumner also gives a detailed treatment of
Dworkin’s position, including the Margo case that features centrally in Dworkin’s discussion. See id. at
108–17.
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incompetent, respect for patients who are incompetent requires according them the
same right to refuse treatment. Refusal should be based on the patient’s own wishes,
either as conveyed in an advance directive or as determined by the patient’s appropriate
proxy. Such “substituted judgment” respects a person’s autonomy and rights in her
current incompetence.
For Dresser and Robertson, this approach is based on a fiction. The nowincompetent person is not an autonomous chooser; that person—the autonomously
choosing person—is no longer present. The incompetent individual now before us
may have quite different interests than the previously competent person who wrote
the directive. She may, for example, no longer have the same interest in preserving
control or in not being dependent on caregivers. 31
This critique rests in part on epistemic considerations: “It is difficult, if not
impossible, for competent individuals to predict their interests in future treatment
situations when they are incompetent . . . .”32 Philosophical theories of identity that
emphasize psychological continuity provide added support. Derek Parfit, for example,
has suggested that a person’s life can consist in a series of successive selves, with a
new self emerging as the individual undergoes significant changes in beliefs, desires,
memories, and intentions.33 If the successive selves are not identical, the authority of
the prior self over the later self becomes questionable. David DeGrazia perspicuously
labels this the “someone else” problem.34
The phenomenon of a very different self is well illustrated by the case of Margo,
brought to prominence in the literature by Dworkin. 35 Andrew Firlik, a medical
student, repeatedly visits Margo, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease. With each
arrival, Margo behaves as if she knows him, though without ever using his name. She
says she reads mysteries, but Firlik notices that “her place in the book jumps randomly
from day to day . . . . [S]he feels good just sitting and humming to herself . . . nodding
off liberally, occasionally turning to a fresh page.”36 She takes abundant pleasure in
simple acts, such as eating peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwiches.37 Firlik writes that
“despite her illness, or maybe somehow because of it, Margo is undeniably one of the
happiest people I have ever known.”38 Undoubtedly, Margo’s past life and concerns
were different than the concerns and life she has now. Does such difference,
considerable as it is, now make her a different person?

31.

See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 30, at 236.

32.

Id.

33.

See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 199–379 (1985).

34. See David DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics 159–202 (2005); David DeGrazia, Advance

Directives, Dementia, and ‘the Someone Else Problem’, 13 Bioethics 373 (1999).
35.

See Dworkin, supra note 15, at 220–32.

36. Andrew D. Firlik, Margo’s Logo, 265 JAMA 201, 201 (1991).
37.

See id.

38. Id.
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It does not. The driving desire behind the very notion of an advance directive is
that people want control over their later lives; the unspoken assumption is that the
incompetent individual is numerically the same person as the prior competent one.
Departing from this common assumption would create all kinds of difficulties,
especially in the law.39 Bodily identity has huge pragmatic advantages as a criterion
of same-individual identity compared to any psychological continuity standard, with
its much greater difficulties for line-drawing and inter-subjective discernment.40
Interpersonally, people just do, in fact, use bodily identity, such as when they uphold
contracts, blame people or praise them, or discern criminal and civil liability. People
also, of course, speak of “becoming a different person,” but their usual reference in
such cases is to personality changes, not to a going-out-of-existence of one person and
a coming-in of another. In any remotely realistic framework for discussing the
authority of advance directives, therefore, we should presume that a patient like
Margo is numerically the same person as she was before her change in dementia.
That said, however, even with Margo regarded as still Margo, a “then-self ”/“nowself ” problem still remains: Although Margo’s identity has not changed, have her
interests changed so much that her earlier directive should not be followed?
A. Dworkin’s View: The Dominance of Critical Interests
In confronting this question, Dworkin maintains that the radical change in some
of a person’s interests in dementia does not undercut the moral authority of advance
directives, including AEDs.41 His argument comes in two key steps. First, the choice
that the competent “then-self ” expressed in a directive does not just manifest
autonomy; it also defines the person’s continuing “critical interests.”42 Second, such
interests dominate mere “experiential interests” in determining what is in the overall
best interests of the person with dementia.43
Because infants and young children lack the mental capacity to weigh different
(and often conflicting) factors and to make their own decisions, it does not make
sense to ascribe to them a right of autonomy. It is also absurd to invoke respect for
autonomy in the case of never-competent adults who have been severely impaired
from birth. In both cases, decisions should be made for them on the basis of their
best interests.
The situation is different for incompetent adults who were previously competent.
The beliefs, desires, and values they have while autonomous choosers form what
Dworkin calls “critical interests.” These are second-order interests, involving a
39.

See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 30, at 236, 239–40.

40. See Howard Klepper & Mary Rorty, Personal Identity, Advance Directives, and Genetic Testing for

Alzheimer Disease, 3 Genetic Testing 99 (1999); Nancy Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68
N.C. L. Rev. 845, 845–65 (1990).
41.

See Dworkin, supra note 15, at 209–13.

42.

Id. The use of the “now-self ”/“then-self ” terminology originates with this author, not with Dworkin.

43.

Id. at 234.
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certain level of thought and ref lection about one’s interests.44 They include, for
example, convictions about “what helps to make a life good on the whole.”45
Such convictions have, as their object of valuation, states of affairs that can obtain
when people are no longer competent or even alive. While experiential interests
continue to exist only as long as someone is experiencing them, critical interests are
not so confined. They exist, to be satisfied or not, even after one no longer experiences
them. Thus, while the dead and those in a persistent vegetative state no longer have
experiential interests, they continue to have critical interests. If someone cares about
what happens to his property, his family, or his reputation after he dies, he has a
critical interest in these things. To dispose of property contrary to his will, to violate
the provisions of his advance directive, or to unfairly tarnish his reputation after his
death are all ways of still harming him.46 That we make such judgments is evidence
that people have non-experiential, critical interests.
While dead and permanently unconscious individuals can have only critical
interests, people with dementia have both types of interests—experiential and
critical—and these may conf lict.47 Suppose that Margo wrote a strong directive
stipulating PAD in any level of dementia as bad as or worse than what she now has,
but that she now experiences her days as a largely happy, and at times even an
energetic, person. According to Dworkin, respect for autonomy requires us to respect
the directive because it represents “a judgment about the overall shape of the kind of
life he [or she] wants to have led.”48 To ignore it, and sacrifice a person’s critical
interests to satisfy experiential interests, would violate autonomy.49
Dworkin’s further claim is that doing so would not only be a violation of
autonomy, but would also misconstrue what is in Margo’s best interests.50 This is
because, for Dworkin, what is ultimately best for Margo is not determined by her
experiential interests but by her critical interests.

44. The distinction between second-order and first-order applies to both desires and interests. One simply

has first-order desires—reflection about another desire is not involved. Second-order desires are desires
about one’s first-order desires. Just as first-order interests form in relation to one’s first-order desires (the
interests that one has in one’s first-order desires being satisfied), similarly, second-order interests form
in relation to one’s second-order desires (the interests that one has in one’s second-order desires being
satisfied). An alternative way of explaining second-order interests is that they form when one has desires
about one’s first-order interests. Both second-order desires and second-order interests involve a degree—
and a kind—of reflection not required of first-order desires and interests.
45.

Dworkin, supra note 15, at 201–02.

46. An extensive treatment of this matter is found in Raymond Angelo Belliotti, Posthumous Harm:

Why the Dead Are Still Vulnerable (2012).
47.

See Dworkin, supra note 15, at 192.

48. Id. at 226.
49. “Making someone die in a way that others approve, but he believes a horrifying contradiction of his life,

is a devastating, odious form of tyranny.” Id. at 217.
50. See id.
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If I decide, when I am competent, that it would be best for me not to
remain alive in a seriously and permanently demented state, then a fiduciary
could contradict me only by exercising an unacceptable form of moral
paternalism . . . . Once we rule out that form of paternalism—once we accept
that we must judge Margo’s critical interests as she did when competent to do
so—then the conflict between autonomy and beneficence seems to disappear.51

Critical interests reflect a person’s integrity and reflective, second-order desires.
They outweigh—they trump—experiential interests in construing what is in a
person’s best interests because they are reinforced at the second-order level. They are
interests about what ultimately matters to people and, thus, are their most important
interests. For Dworkin, then, Margo’s best interests—as well as her autonomy—
support following her advance directive.
B. Jaworska’s Critique: New Critical Interests
Jaworska, perhaps Dworkin’s most well-known critic on advance directives for
dementia, grants him his claim about the dominant weight of critical interests.52
Where Jaworska differs from Dworkin is in seeing persons with dementia as still
capable of generating new critical interests, including ones about the value of life.53
Jaworska appeals to the distinction between values and desires. Desiring is the
more basic, first-order notion. By contrast, valuing involves reflection. We do not
always value what we desire—we try to break habits, for example. To value something
is not merely to want it, but to think that it is good—that is a kind of second-order
appraisal. For Dworkin, to form critical interests one must be capable of having
convictions about what makes life—one’s own life—good as a whole. This cannot be
said for Jaworska, for whom critical interests can issue from simpler second-order
desires. “[C]onvictions about what is good to have . . . do not require the ability to
grasp or review one’s whole life.”54
Jaworska provides the example of Mrs. D., who was diagnosed with probable
Alzheimer’s disease, and is now moderately to severely impaired. Mrs. D. volunteers
for medical research and explains her decision: “I could have said, ‘no,’ but believe me,

51.

Id.

52.

See Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value,
28 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 105, 112 (1999).
In the case of an ordinary competent person, when his critical interests (his judgments
and values) come into conflict with his experiential interests (what would lead to the
optimal state of mind for him), we do not hesitate to give precedence to his wellconsidered values and judgments, and we concede that this is, overall, best for him. . . .
The case of our demented person turns out to be no different: in his conflict between
ongoing experiential and critical interests, it is also best to privilege the latter.
Id.

53.

See id. at 112–14.

54. Id. at 113.
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if I can help me and my [fellow] man, I would do it.”55 This suggests that Mrs. D. had
considered her decision and thought it would be wrong to refuse, which is a clear
second-order activity. Mrs. D. does not have mere desires and experiential interests;
she has values. She can form new critical interests.56
Jaworska believes that what often happens to persons in dementia is that they
change some of their values. They “are naturally inclined to . . . appreciate . . . simpler
pleasures. Thus, after developing Alzheimer’s, even former highbrow intellectuals
come to value, or value more highly, the pleasures of listening to music, gardening,
yoga, simple art-making, telling fanciful stories to their grandchildren . . . .”57
For Jaworska, such changes are crucial to assessing the validity of an advance
directive. It is one thing for someone to write an advance directive directing their
treatment in case of permanent unconsciousness; the directive has full authority
because later there is no currently active agent. It is quite different with an advance
directive for dementia, when there will still be a valuer. “The person executing an
advance directive for dementia is more akin to someone who anticipates that his
values will change for the worse in the future and attempts to hold his future self to
his current values by making others promise that they will, at a future time, enforce
his current values against his will.”58 What, Jaworska asks, would justify privileging
the earlier values? Few of us, for example would want to be held to the values we
espoused in our teens or twenties. Then why should the demented person be held to
values she no longer holds?
C. Taking Stock of the Dworkin-Jaworska Argument
Jaworska may seem to have the more compelling view. She is right in claiming that
a person’s values and self-concept, not merely experiential interests, can change in
dementia—at least in dementia’s early stages when people sometimes come to appreciate
different activities. This is the force of Jaworska’s highly intellectual grandmother,59
whom I choose to call “Helen.” Her new appreciation for yoga, gardening, simple artmaking, and telling stories to her grandchildren not only indicates new values, but
likely also a change of mind about what makes living worthwhile, even if she no longer
has sufficient memory to consider her life as a whole.
To a large extent, however, Jaworska and Dworkin talk past each other. Their
points often depend on different accounts of critical interests, and they work with
different paradigms of dementia. For Jaworska, anyone capable of second-order
desires is a valuer, someone who is capable of generating new critical interests and
changes of mind. For Dworkin, critical interests are more than just any values or
second-order desires; they involve notions such as character, life-long convictions,
55.

Id. at 118.

56. See id.
57.

Id. at 120.

58. Id. at 137.
59.

See id. at 120.
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and views of “what makes life good as a whole.” Jaworska has thus not shown that
Dworkin is mistaken about the ability of patients in dementia to have new critical
interests in his sense. Rather, she has offered a different conception of critical interests,
one that arguably does not address the kinds of reasons Dworkin offers for saying
that critical interests trump experiential ones in the overall construal of best
interests—their roots in character, conviction, and the value that people see in their
lives as a whole.
Though someone like Helen has new values and a new appreciation of certain
activities, it is not clear that she has changed her mind about the value of her life in
dementia, which is the primary evaluation she was expressing in her AED. In any
case, even if an engaged Helen is an example of a demented person who has changed
her mind, at some point further into progressive dementia people cannot change
their minds in the relevant sense. As Ron Berghmans poignantly puts it, if you write
a directive to refuse life support and request death assistance with the onset of severe
dementia, then “at the time you would most likely ‘change your mind’” your
experiences have become so radically different that “you don’t have enough mind left
to change.”60 At that point, a person’s only critical interests are the ones that were
generated previously.
Jaworska’s claim that Margo falls into the category of someone capable of
generating new critical interests61 is plausible only because Margo is not severely
demented. Her critique fails to apply to someone in severe dementia, incapable of
valuing of any kind and certainly incapable of generating new critical interests. A
person in dementia at that stage does not reflect on her desires or deem them good
or bad; she simply has them, like an infant or a very young child.
She may, though, give an indication of being happy, or at least feeling content. She
may, for example, eat with pleasure, smile occasionally, and utter sounds of apparent
pleasure when stroked and talked to or when cuddling stuffed animals. Even with
severe dementia, a person can be one of the happy demented. I will refer to such a
person as “Ruth.”
Suppose that Ruth wrote a well-informed AED to be applied in severe dementia,
and that she reiterated it over time, as recently as in her early dementia. Dresser and
Robertson, focusing on her present experiential interests, would say that we should not
follow the directive. Dworkin would say we should, on the grounds of both respecting
her autonomy and satisfying her best interests because her best interests are ultimately
dominated by her critical interests. Jaworska does not consider this sort of case, but
since she agrees with Dworkin that critical interests trump in determining best
interests, it would seem she would also say that Ruth’s directive should be followed.
However contented or happy Ruth is, even in Jaworska’s analysis, people in this stage
no longer have the capacity for self-governance or autonomy. They cannot generate
new critical interests. They cannot change their mind about their advance directive.

60. Ron Berghmans, Advance Directives and Dementia, 913 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 105, 107 (2000).
61.

See Jaworska, supra note 52, at 135 n.54.
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This analysis, using Dworkin and Jaworska, makes many convincing claims
about a person in severe dementia, but, in the end, it does not provide an adequate
analysis about whether to follow the AED expressed by someone like Ruth or Margo.
The heart of the problem is that, in construing a demented person’s best interests, it
is a stretch to claim that critical interests should always dominate experiential ones.
V. THE VARYING VALUE OF LIFE

People in late-stage dementia still have worth, must be treated with dignity, and
are entitled to respect. The notion of dignity applicable to dementia has to do with
more than present capacities. In that respect, Dworkin’s central claim is correct: we
respect people with dementia in part because of what they were—autonomous, selfconstituting, self-conscious selves, with narrative identities that they manifested in
multiple ways, perhaps explicitly proclaimed, and still retain. But in late-stage
dementia, we also respect people because of the present consciousness that remains,
and because of their continuing roles in networks of relations. Patients with severe
dementia are still husbands or wives, mothers or fathers, grandmothers or grandfathers.
They are still part of the human family.
So the question remains: How do we best demonstrate respect for them—by
following the AED they may have or by disregarding it? Numerous complicating
elements require multiple answers to this question. One complicating element is that
the value of life to the demented person herself varies widely. Two factors,
psychological continuity and narrative identity, fundamentally affect that value.
What, in severe dementia, is the experiential value of life? Experiential interests
remain, but there is very little—if any—anticipation or memory. Without them,
psychological continuity within the person’s subjective life is weak. This greatly
affects the stake that someone with dementia has in continuing to exist.62 The person
lives in a kind of eternal present, without the ability to envisage her future existence
or have desires about it. In that state the value of survival to the person at the time is
greatly diminished.
Consider Ruth. She derives enjoyment from various kinds of experiences and, in a
certain minimal and simple sense, she wants to have these experiences. In that respect,
she wants to go on living—since being alive is a condition of her having the experiences
that, at the time she has them, she apparently wants. One cannot conclude from this,
however, that she values her survival or has a stake in her continued existence, for her
cognitive deficits prevent her from even anticipating them. Without that ability to
anticipate, any future existence is not what matters to her. And when she survives and
actually arrives at the future moment that she cannot anticipate, she will not see it as
her survival if she has no memory of her earlier existence.
In these respects, she is comparable to an infant. In contrast to an infant, however,
Ruth’s psychological continuity with her future will continue to weaken. As it does,
62. See Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing 503 (2002). McMahan develops a Time-Relative Interest

Account (TRIA) of the harm of death. It is not determined solely by how much good life (in terms of
quantity and quality) one loses, but also by the extent to which one is psychologically connected with
one’s future.
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her stake in her own existence diminishes further. This progression is also true for
someone like Margo, although Margo’s experiential interests—her enjoyment of a
range of activities, her energy for living—are considerably stronger than Ruth’s. The
conflict between Margo’s experiential interests in continuing to live and her critical
interest in not living in dementia, as expressed in her AED, is thus sharper than this
conflict is for Ruth.
And Ruth’s dementia is far from the most severe that dementia can be. A person
can be utterly passive and unresponsive, not even merely contented as is Ruth, in
which case the person’s stake in survival is even lower. Let us call such a person
“Walter.” To be sure, if Walter is not suffering, life may still hold some experiential
value for him, but that value is slim. There is thus barely any conflict between his
experiential value in living and his critical interest in dying, per his AED. To say in
such a case that even for Walter his critical interest in dying still does not outweigh
his extremely low experiential interest in living would imply that we were attributing
an exceptionally low value to his critical interests. We would be treating him as a
virtually never-competent person who had no critical interests—treatment that
would badly disrespect him as the person he is.
In addition to the role that psychological continuity plays in the strength of
someone’s interest in survival, narrative identity also affects the value of life in
dementia. Our stake in continuing to exist is largely as the individuals we conceive
ourselves to be—that is, with narrative identity. The further a future departs from
our conception of ourselves and the story of our lives—our character, commitments,
and values—the weaker the stake we have in it. What makes survival into severe
dementia to many so valueless—and to some, even horrifying—is that they will have
lost this identity in any conscious sense and thus will no longer be themselves.
The matter, however, is worse yet. The narrative identity people have staked out,
in part with an AED if they have one, does not disappear when they become severely
demented. This identity, and the critical interests it defines, continues to be attached
to the person who now lives in severe dementia. Continuing their lives, against the
request of their AED, snubs that identity. Because of this, the continued life here is
not just valueless; it has negative value. Death is preferable.
In situations like that of Lotte (the Dutch woman whose dementia involved
unrelievable suffering), there is no positive experiential value in continuing life to
stand in conflict with the critical interests expressed in her AED. There, the case for
respecting the AED is strong and clear. The case for respecting it is also clear,
however, for a person like Walter, who is in such severe dementia that he does not
show even the minimal contentment and happiness of someone like Ruth. In his sort
of situation, there is still some experiential interest in life, but because it is so
minimal, it is readily outweighed by continuing critical interests. The hard cases
occur when there is a significant conflict between experiential and critical interests,
as with Margo and, arguably, Ruth. In those hard cases, we cannot avoid the difficult
task of looking closely at both critical and experiential interests to discern their
respective weights in determining the value of life and best interests.
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VI. A SLIDING SCALE

This wide range of cases can be handled by employing a “sliding scale.” One of
its dimensions concerns narrative identity and a person’s AED. Another dimension
concerns the experiential value of life.
How people end life is an important part of the meaning of their lives. Respect
for persons includes giving them control over that end. Advance directives enable
them to do this, and, in general, should be followed. Otherwise we treat them very
disrespectfully, as if they were never competent.
Not all advance directives, however, have the same moral force. Carefully
considered advance directives based on a realistic assessment of the facts and that
reflect a person’s enduring values have greater moral force than AEDs that do not.
People who wish to avoid severe dementia through an advance directive need to be
informed about dementia’s various stages and what life may be like in them. They
should be aware that it is likely impossible to know whether the later person with
dementia will be one of the happy demented, or one of the frightened, anxious, or
distressingly confused. Furthermore, moral weight is added to a directive if it is
reiterated in the relatively early stages of dementia when a person can still understand
it. All of this places a burden on people who want to make advance directives for
PAD, but not an unreasonable burden given the gravity of what they are asking
others to do at a later time.
Carefully considered AEDs should also not be the result of mere prejudice or an
unthinking assumption that life in dementia is unmitigated horror, nor should they
express other kinds of blatantly unreasonable preferences. To Ludwig Minelli,
founder of the Swiss organization Dignitas, which caters to foreigners coming to
Switzerland for aid in dying, it does not matter why the person wants to die; the only
value is self-determination.63 But it does matter. As Rhoden put it, “When they start
saying, ‘If I can’t do higher mathematics, kill me,’ we will have to worry in earnest
about the limits of precedent autonomy.”64
Even when an AED is written with adequate knowledge of, and without prejudice
against, dementia, however, the substantive question of employing it to avoid living
in dementia may not lend itself to a simple yes-or-no answer. One complicating
factor is the possibility that the writer of the AED, who preferred death to living in
dementia, might change her mind. Helen is arguably such a person.65 Jaworska sees
Margo as a person who also has changed her mind.
Indeed, Margo generally enjoys her current life, but it does not follow that she
has necessarily changed her mind about the value of her life in dementia. From her
engagement in various activities and enjoyment of them, one might infer that her life
63. See Amelia Gentleman, Inside the Dignitas House, Guardian (London) (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.

guardian.co.uk/society/2009/nov/18/assisted-suicide-dignitas-house.
64. Rhoden, supra note 40, at 860.
65.

Unlike Mrs. D., who is based on an actual person, Helen is a fictitious example. How realistic is Helen?
It should be pointed out that at one presentation of parts of this article, an experienced physician in the
audience said that he had never met a demented person like Helen.

339

ADVANCE DIRECTIVES, DEMENTIA, AND ELIGIBILITY FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH

now has value to her—a value she did not anticipate when she wrote her AED. On
this interpretation, Margo has changed her mind, and it is plainly wrong to hold her
to her prior values. One could also argue, however, that while Margo retains capacity
for enjoyment, she no longer has the cognitive capacity to consider or reflect on what
makes her life as a whole worth living, and therefore she is not capable of revising or
rejecting her previous values in the sort of robust form necessary to generate an
AED. In the last analysis, between these two conflicting perceptions, it may simply
be unclear whether Margo has changed her mind about the value of her life.
Suppose, amidst this ambiguity about change of mind, that one decided that
Margo’s clear AED should be regarded as indicative of her reflective preferences and
relevant critical interests. To respect her autonomy, we should then implement her
AED. But autonomy is not the only consideration. Margo also has experiential interests
in continued life. The happier and more engaged she is, the stronger are her experiential
interests in living, and the harder it is to justify ending her life—even if her AED is
informed and clear, and she has not changed her mind in the relevant sense.
Hesitancy springs from more than just her experiential happiness. Would
acceding to her directive be socially tolerable? Aid in dying implicates many more
people than just the recipient. It involves the individual physician who participates,
and the medical community as a whole insofar as it provides guidelines and
safeguards. Also involved, as part of the web of relationships of the person with
dementia, are friends, family members, and other caregivers. The decision to allow
people to receive aid in dying is a social one and, to put the point starkly, do we really
want to be the sort of society where some people who are living happy lives, lives
they now apparently enjoy and want to continue, are put to death?
Even Dworkin acknowledges that there might be valid reasons for refusing to
follow the directive of a happily demented person.66 He only insists that if such
refusal is justifiable, “we cannot claim to be acting for her [Margo’s] sake,”67 for he
thinks that when we consider the critical interests of the happily demented, carrying
out their directives is still in their overall best interests.
Carrying out Margo’s AED would indeed respect her autonomy, but it is
doubtful, at least, that it would be in her best interests. For Dworkin, the matter is
simple: critical interests invariably trump experiential ones.68 But what is the
argument for thinking that invariably they trump?69 Even if we acknowledge that
autonomy favors implementing the directive, it strains credibility to insist that the
happily demented person who still has some zest for life would be better off dead.
The clearest case of the opposite sort, when the argument for following a person’s
AED is strongest, is when the individual experiences severe and irremediable suffering,
66. Dworkin makes this point in his response to Seana Shiffrin. Dworkin and His Critics: With

Replies by Dworkin 370 (Justine Burley ed., 2004).
67.

Dworkin, supra note 15, at 232.

68. See id. at 231.
69. Similar reservations about the dominance of critical interests are expressed by L.W. Sumner. Sumner,

supra note 30, at 115–16.
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as Lotte apparently did. It is clearly in Lotte’s interest that her directive be carried out.
That does not mean, however, that the Dutch position is right in making unbearable
suffering a necessary condition for voluntary euthanasia. I reject the Dutch view that
voluntary euthanasia is permissible only in the presence of unbearable suffering.
A definitive case for this claim is Walter. He is more passive than Ruth, neither
happy nor miserable, and no longer capable of changing his mind about his AED.
When autonomous and reflective on his life as a whole, he found death preferable to
the prospect of living in complete dependence, without any compensating pleasures,
unable to recognize—much less converse with—family and loved ones, and using up
all the final resources he badly wanted to leave for particular persons and causes.
Suppose that Walter reiterated that choice in the last part of his life, including the
stage when he was mildly demented. Then, both out of respect for his autonomy and
in recognition that his stake in continuing to live is vanishingly small, his directive
should be followed. We should not have to show that he is experiencing “unbearable
suffering” to carry out his AED. The justification for following it is the combination
of two facts: that he has clearly, knowledgeably, and persistently said that he did not
want to end his life in years of severe dementia, and that his current experiential
interest in living is so weak.
It is possible to summarize these various considerations into a sliding scale that
incorporates both autonomy and the current capacity for enjoyment.70 An advance
directive for PAD, written by an informed and competent person, gains in authority
as the capacities of a person to generate new critical interests and to enjoy life
decrease. It has less authority, by contrast, when the person retains the ability to
value and generate new critical interests and still gives indication of enjoying her life.
Helen, and perhaps Margo, exemplify the latter, Walter and Ruth the former.
To be sure, for Ruth the application of the sliding scale is difficult, but it still
leans toward implementing her directive. Yes, Ruth is somewhat happy, but not as
happy as Margo; still less does she have any of the zest for life exemplified by
someone like Helen. Whether Ruth’s AED should be followed depends on the
strength of the relevant critical and experiential interests. If Ruth had very strong
views about not living in dementia—like Lotte did, for example—her AED should
be followed. Her critical interest in not living in severe dementia is clear and strong,
she no longer has the capacity to change it, and her experiential interest in life is
relatively weak.
The determining factor is not, as it would be under Dworkin and Jaworska’s
analysis, that Ruth’s critical interests define her best interests; it is that her experiential
interest in continued life is weak and her critical interests are clear and strong. The
larger moral picture now comes into view. If we maintained that the experiential value
of Ruth’s survival, as weak as it is, still outweighed the autonomy and deep convictions
70. The notion of a sliding scale is borrowed from Allen Buchanan and Dan W. Brock. See Allen Buchanan

& Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others: Competency, 64 Milbank Q. 17, 67–80 (1986). Some of the same
factors included in the sliding scale here are used by Leslie P. Francis. See Leslie P. Francis,
Decisionmaking at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer’s or Other Dementia, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 539, 588–
92 (2001).
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that comprise a significant part of her narrative identity, we would be saying, in effect,
that such autonomy and conviction counted for very little indeed. We would be
treating the now incompetent but previously competent person as if she had never
been competent, a great affront to autonomous persons and their narrative identity.
VII. PROGRESSIVE DEMENTIA AS A KIND OF TERMINAL ILLNESS

Thus, neither unbearable suffering nor contemporary competence holds up as a
necessary moral requirement for justified assisted death. The extremely important
requirement of voluntariness that is the rationale for contemporary competence can
be met by a sufficiently clear, informed, and persistent AED that a person did not
change when she still had the capacity to do so. So, too, the rationale behind a
requirement of unbearable suffering can be met in other ways. Its underlying rationale
is that with such unmitigated suffering, the balance of value left in life has turned
negative, and therefore, life is worse than death. But that rationale can also be met
when severe dementia greatly diminishes the stake that a person continues to have in
her own survival. There, too, in the face of the strong critical interests reflected in a
person’s clear, knowledgeable, and persistent AED, the value that is now left in life
has, on balance, turned negative.
Terminal illness, the rationale for the third of the legal eligibility conditions used
to prevent abuse, can also gain traction in dementia. Dementia itself is seldom labeled
a terminal illness, but in severe dementia of the typical progressive sort, degeneration
occurs “gradually and inexorably, usually leading to death in a severely debilitated,
immobile state between four and twelve years after onset.” 71 The relevant element is
not merely the inevitability of the years-long march toward death, but the kind of
debilitation involved along the way. In most chronic, progressive disease situations
other than dementia, there is good reason for not seeing as “terminally ill” someone
who is probably still years away from death. First, line-drawing issues present
themselves—would we then categorize advanced old age itself, for example, as
“terminal illness,” for the march toward death is inevitable there, too? Second, too
much life will often still be left to live to put all that remains under the color of
impending death; death may indeed be coming, down the road, but the road has
many segments yet to travel before getting there. A third consideration is that any
prognosis of death within a certain number of months becomes less certain the larger
that the requisite number of months becomes.
Progressive dementia that is already severe is different on all three of these scores.
It is utterly different than non-demented old age itself: much less valuable life is left
in the years of severe dementia than in the years of non-demented old age. And the
prognosis of eventual death from the advance of the dementia itself is at least as
secure as a prognosis of death within six months in most fatal illnesses.
Overlying all of these considerations is the central fact of the degree of mental
debilitation in severe dementia. That has already brought to an end—or very near to
71.

Dworkin, supra note 15, at 219 (quoting Dennis J. Selkoe, Amyloid Protein and Alzheimer’s Disease, 265
Sci. Am. 68, 68 (1991)).
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the end—the life that the person regards as valuable and that the person is gratified
to have had. In severe dementia, the self has literally withered. From a personal
perspective, therefore, severe dementia already constitutes real dying. The point is
bolstered by reflecting on the comparison between an illness in which our prognosis
is that we are within six months of death, and the years-long chronic illness of severe
dementia. To me, anyone who writes a clear and persistent AED for dementia is
likely to see severe dementia as equally, if not more so, their “last stage” years when
life is nearly over as they are likely to see any last six months when diagnosed with a
more typical terminal illness. In the terms that matter to people, the rationale for
limiting PAD to terminal illness applies just as much to multiple years of severe
progressive dementia as it does to life predicted to end within six months.
VIII. THE ROAD FROM CURRENT LEGALIZATION TO ADVANCE EUTHANASIA
DIRECTIVES

Morally, the previous argument can be summarized in four points. First, there is
a strong prima facie case for following advance directives in dementia, both for the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and for aid in dying. Advance directives
enable people to have some measure of control over the way they die, and the way
they die is an important reflection of how they have lived. This cannot be said better
than Nancy Rhoden has:
Something is wrong . . . when we treat formerly competent patients as if they
were never competent. Someone who makes a prior directive sees herself as
the unified subject of a human life. She sees her concern for her body, her
goals, or her family as transcending her incapacity . . . . [O]ne . . . component
of treating persons with respect [is] that we view them as they view themselves.
If we are to do this, we must not ignore their prior choices and values.72

At the same time, countervailing factors must be considered. These can be
summarized in the remaining points.
Second, the clearer and more informed and persistent an advance directive, the
more moral authority it has. Writers of AEDs need to be aware of the varying stages
and affective dimensions of dementia, and they should assess and reiterate them well
into beginning dementia.
Third, the case for following an AED is strongest in the presence of severe and
irremediable suffering. This is exemplified by the case of Lotte, the woman in
advanced dementia who received euthanasia in the Netherlands in March 2011.
Fourth, for other cases, a sliding scale that considers both autonomy and the
capacity for enjoyment provides the justification for determining when an AED
should be followed. As the demented person’s capacity to generate new critical
interests and to enjoy life decreases, a clear, informed, and persistent AED gains in
authority for implementation.
Applying this sliding scale generates conclusions to all the cases; Mrs. D. and
Helen, on the moderate or mild end of dementia’s spectrum, are two of the easiest.
72. Rhoden, supra note 40, at 860.
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The compelling conclusion about implementing their AEDs is “not yet.” Significant
dementia has diminished their capacity to change their minds and their critical
interests, but Helen, especially, has adapted to her dementia with new interests and
real zest for life. Both enjoy and value the lives they are living. Their strong
experiential interests in living outweigh any critical interest they have, from their
AEDs, in not living in dementia. As of this point in time, dementia has turned out not
to be as dreadful as they feared.
Another relatively easy case is at the opposite end of the spectrum: Walter, who
is very severely demented and without the minimal contentment and happiness of
Ruth. If his AED is informed, clear, and persistent, it should be implemented. He
now has no capacity to generate new critical interests, and he takes little—if any—
enjoyment in life.
Ruth’s directive, too, should be implemented, though her case is more complex
because she is largely content and somewhat happy. As such, she has some experiential
interest in continued survival, but because she has no capacity to generate any new
critical interests, and because the value of her life to herself is greatly diminished by
her inability either to remember or to anticipate, any clear and persistent AED she
has should be implemented.
The hardest case is Margo. She can likely still value particular experiences, and
many she now has she certainly enjoys. It is not clear, however, whether she can
observe or reflect on life enough to value it, and she appears not to have the capacity
to reflect on her life as a whole. If she has a strong and reiterated AED stated to
include the moderately severe level of her current dementia, she exemplifies a sharp
clash between autonomy and critical interests, on the one hand, and current
experiential interests on the other. Margo has enough capacity for memory and
anticipation to generate real enjoyment of life. In light of that enjoyment, on balance,
society should firmly say for her, “Not yet.”
The road from legalized aid in dying and euthanasia to legally actionable AEDs
for severe dementia thus has a sound moral basis. By their very own rationales, none
of the three eligibility conditions currently in place for legally permissible PAD is
strictly required. Contemporary competence is not the only context in which the
crucial moral demand for voluntariness can be satisfied; a clear, well-informed,
persistent advance directive also satisfies it. The requirement of terminal illness in
the sense that people are with reasonable certainty near the end of their lives is met
just as clearly by end-stage progressive dementia as it is by other illnesses with
prognosis of death within six months. The rationale that there is no positive balance
of value left in life is satisfied not only by unbearable suffering, but when the
experiential value of survival is so minimal that it is outweighed by the strong critical
interests reflected in a clear and persistent AED.
In conclusion, two observations can be added about the larger legal context for
AEDs. First, the emergence of AEDs as morally acceptable can have more than one
logical legal home. One is the Netherlands, where euthanasia is legal (evidenced by
the real case of Lotte). There, voluntariness, not just unbearable suffering, is a
required condition for permissible euthanasia, and a strong and reiterated AED can
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be interpreted as making euthanasia voluntary. An equally logical home for AEDs,
however, is the legalized aid in dying of Vermont, Oregon, Washington, British
Columbia, and Switzerland. There, too, the emphasis on voluntariness can be
plausibly extended to include AEDs. Those jurisdictions’ laws, of course, would have
to be rewritten (or their court decisions extended), but the current requirements of
terminal prognosis within six months and current competency73 are at odds with aid
in dying’s fundamental emphasis on voluntariness. The underlying legal and moral
framework of these jurisdictions, too, can incorporate carefully implemented AEDs.
Second, most of this analysis of implementing advance directives for dementia
applies as much to the refusal of life-supporting treatment as it does to PAD. The
same dilemmas arise about interpreting change of mind and weighing critical and
experiential interests. All of the types of persons with dementia analyzed regarding
implementation of an AED can also have a more traditional directive for refusal of
life support. Presumably, those whose aim in having an AED is to not live long in
severe dementia would want to include in their directive not just PAD—but also the
withholding and withdrawal of feeding tubes, for example, and the refusal of most
hospitalization from nursing homes. Such “regular” directives for refusing lifesupportive treatment in dementia are legally actionable and pair logically with AEDs,
yet AEDs are not now legally permitted. The precedent of these already actionable
advance directives has great practical importance. A high percentage of patients with
advanced dementia in nursing homes develop infectious episodes and eating
problems, and many are hospitalized for acute crises multiple times a year.74 In so far
as advance directives to refuse life support are already being implemented for patients
like Ruth and Walter, and to the extent that we are confident about the appropriate
contexts in which their implementation is justified, they provide important precedent
for the eventual acceptance of AEDs.

73. In Switzerland, only current competency is required. See supra text accompanying note 3.
74.

In a study of 323 nursing home residents with advanced dementia, 45% lived longer than eighteen
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ninety days of life was 1.6 transfers. See Mitchell et al., supra note 25, at 45–46; Susan L. Mitchell et al.,
The Clinical Course of Advanced Dementia, 361 New Eng. J. Med. 1529, 1529–38 (2009).
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